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The recent (re-)establishment of constitutional democracies in 
Central and Eastern Europe is subject to a number of paradoxical 
phenomena. There is the tension suggested by Pierre Rosanvallon, 
regarding the state of democracy, i.e. ‘[h]ow to understand the 
turning point of the 1990s, which strangely saw the 
disenchantment with the life of democracies grow at the very 
moment that the fall of communism seemed to vindicate their 
supremacy?’ [2006, 189]. In a slightly different sense, Dick 
Howard has argued that ‘the revolutions of 1989 have to “catch-
up” with the Western model of the nation-state, just at the 
moment when, according to Habermas’s notion of “constitutional 
patriotism”, that traditional model has supposedly lost its hold!’ 
[Howard 1995, 1428]. These tensions can be equally put for 
modern constitutionalism [cf. Walker 2002], i.e., how to 
understand the confirmation of the global rise and expansion of 
constitutionalism in the ‘legal revolutions’ of 1989, at the very 
moment that an increasing disenchantment with and challenges to 
modern constitutionalism have become visible? These three 
tensions - that of the apparent obsoletion of liberal democracy, of 
national sovereignty, and of modern constitutionalism - and in 
particular the last one, will inform the rest of the paper. 
I will focus in particular on the obsoleteness or crisis of recently 
introduced modern constitutionalism in the new EU member 
states (although the problématiques I discuss have wider 
implications for modern constitutionalism in Europe). The 
obsoleteness or crisis of constitutionalism I am alluding to has 
some affinities with Emile Durkheim's notion of 'anomie'. In 
Durkheim’s view, anomie emerges in a situation of an absence of 
regulation of social relationships, resulting in declining social 
solidarity [Durkheim 1997, 304]. Anomie is then about a 
disjunction between the legal and the social [Augenstein and 
                                                     
1 Earlier versions of this paper have been presented at the workshop 'Democracy, 
Freedom and Imperialism: Debating James Tully’s Public Philosophy in a New Key', EUI, 
Florence, 21-22 September 2009, the 9th Conference of the European Sociological 
Association, ‘European Society or European Societies?’, Lisbon, 2-5 September, 2009, and 
in the Seminar Series-Post-Doctoral Researchers PAT, Department of Sociology and Social 
Resarch, University of Trento, 25 February, 2010. 
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Hendry 2009, fn 24]. With regard to the problématique of modern 
constitutionalism in contemporary Europe, there is arguably a 
situation of anomie in the sense that there seems to exist a 
profound mismatch between existing institutions, institutionalised 
models and norms, and imaginaries (here designated as modern, 
Westphalian constitutionalism based on a unitary nation-state) and 
a rapidly changing political and societal context that does in 
crucial ways not correspond to an institutionalised, Westphalian 
framework. In other words, there are a number of clear 
discrepancies between institutions and society. This disjunction 
seems to be particularly evident in the landscape of the recently 
established constitutional democracies in Central and Eastern 
Europe. 
On the one hand, and to rephrase the tension affecting 
modern and national constitutionalism, it has often been argued 
that the constitutional transformations since 1989 (or, more 
accurately, since the late 1970s) [cf. Irena Grudzinska-Gross 1997; 
Sajó 1990], have strengthened – and even amplified [Arjomand 
2003] - international tendencies in the form of ‘rights revolutions’ 
[Přibáň & Sadurski 2006], and their crystallization into a 
reinvigorated, ‘new constitutionalism’. New constitutionalism is 
grounded in national sovereignty and constitutional democracy, 
the idea of fundamental rights and the notion of the rule of law, 
while the most important ‘new’ element is the protection of the 
constitution by an independent guardian, i.e., through judicial 
review by constitutional courts. In this sense, the East reinforces 
and ‘amplifies’ longer term Western (European) and global 
traditions of constitutional democracy and human rights that have 
emerged most forcefully since the Second World War, and in 
which the balance of constitutional democracy is increasingly on 
the former rather than the latter component. 
On the other hand, the return to constitutionalism and liberal 
democracy of the region comes at a specific moment in world 
history in which nation-state based and monist constitutionalism 
or ‘modern constitutionalism’ [Tully 1995] can be seen as 
increasingly problematic and challenged, and as subject to a 
variety of tensions and the centrifugal pressures of fragmentation. 
Homogeneity and coherence, elements which are at the core of 
traditional constitutional democracy, are under strain due to 
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inroads into national sovereignty of a supranational and 
subnational kind (notably through EU integration and regional 
governance respectively, as well as a plurality of relevant actors). 
Further tensions result from a variety of calls for self-rule and 
cultural recognition, and more profoundly, due to the increasingly 
untenable and anachronistic, but immanent tendencies to 
homogenization and centralization in the modern constitutional 
ontology [cf. Tully 1995] that run counter to tendencies of 
pluralization and post-nationalism. 
In a related way, constitutional, representative democracy is 
increasingly seen as failing to respond to challenges to its promise 
of democracy and popular sovereignty. The latter can be summed 
up as a ‘democratic deficit’, in that populist critique of the political 
status quo, and calls for more civic voice, participation and local 
government, as well as claims for recognition and plurality in the 
context of identity politics, are widespread, but existing forms of 
constitutional democracy seem to lack in the means of responding 
adequately to such demands. 
The paper will proceed as follows. I will first briefly analyse to 
what extent it can be claimed that the new constitutionalism 
adopted in the former communist countries is a reinvigorated 
version of Westphalian, modern constitutionalism. To the extent 
that this seems indeed to be the case, I will, secondly, outline a 
number of problématiques or tensions that affect modern 
constitutionalism in the current European context, and that 
contribute to a situation of constitutional anomie. These include 
four problématiques in particular: state-centrism, cultural diversity, 
depoliticization, and civic exclusion. In the third section, I will 
(tentatively) discuss possible solutions to or ways out of these four 
problématiques by hinting at, in a descriptive sense, insufficiently 
(or un-)explored dimensions of the Central and Eastern European 
constitutions that might, if made visible and reinforced, counter at 
least some of the problématiques. And in a more normative sense, 
I will at the same time indicate possible steps towards 
constitutional change that would, in my view, make current 
constitutional orders more amenable to challenges of pluralism, 
democratic legitimacy, and post-nationalism. What is more, these 
steps point at a – in my view - salient and overdue transformation 
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of modern constitutionalism as such, making it more compatible 
with democracy and civic inclusion and participation. 
2. New Constitutionalism in the New Europe 
The 'modern' character of constitutionalism in Central and 
Eastern Europe can be corroborated by at least four aspects: an 
exceptional emphasis on legalism, a prominence of fundamental 
rights, an emphasis on an integrative, symbolic constitutional 
dimension, and the articulation of a strong break with the past by 
means of constitutions. First, the establishment of constitutional 
democracies in post-communist Europe followed the region-wide 
'legal revolutions' and involved an unusually strong emphasis on 
legality and the legal (as opposed to revolutionary) character of the 
changes [cf. Arjomand 2003; Häberle 1992; Přibáň & Sadurski 
2006]. A main reason for this emphasis on legalism, legal 
continuity, and the rule of law is deemed to have emerged as an 
antidote to the ‘ideological’ [Arjomand] or ‘contradictory’ [Přibáň 
and Sadurski] socialist legality of the communist regimes. As 
argued by Said Amir Arjomand: 
 
The abuse of ‘legality’ by Communism and Fascism necessitated a 
new, amplified, rights-based conception of the rule of law, which 
includes justiciable human rights substantively, and specifies mechanisms 
and institutional devices for safeguarding the rule of law – most notably 
the constitutional courts, and in some countries, additionally, the office 
of the Ombudsperson. It has been noted… that while the American-
style, ‘diffuse’ judicial review appears as a good guarantor of the rule of 
law in the old, narrow sense, the constitutional courts, modeled on 
Kelsen’s design in the Austrian Constitution of 1920 but with a very 
significant extension, have lent themselves admirably to the guarantee of 
the rule of law in the new, amplified sense. The key to the role of the 
constitutional court as the instrument of the new constitutionalism is the 
idea of transition to democracy – first in post-Fascist Germany and Italy, 
then in post-authoritarian southern Europe, and finally in post-
Communist Eastern Europe and Russia. The idea, and the institution of 
constitutional courts, became all the more attractive after 1989 as it held 
the promise of joining Europe. 
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Second, and in a related way, the revolutions of 1989 can be 
understood as 'rights revolutions', in the sense that a main element 
in the struggle against communism was the dissident claim for the 
recognition of European and international rights standards 
[Přibáň & Sadurski 2006]. What makes the new constitutional 
democracies in Central and Eastern Europe somewhat different - 
if not in kind but at least in degree - from existing, ‘old’ 
democracies is an unusually strong emphasis on additional 
safeguards for human rights and rule of law protection, and the 
facilitation of democratization through constitutionalization 
[Arjomand 2003; Sadurski 2005]. In this reading, the main aims of 
the political and constitutional transformations were a kind of 
appropriation, reproduction, inculcation, and safeguarding of 
prevalent understandings of constitutional democracy, through 
the establishment of independent democratic regimes with full 
and uncontested national sovereignty [cf. Offe 1996], and the 
creation of coherent and clearly confined legal systems, based on 
the ‘higher’ law of the constitution and the idea of the protection 
of rights. 
Third, the latter did, however, not only entail the (re-) 
foundation of enforceable legal systems, with the appropriate 
institutional division of labour, and independent status of the 
judicial system and foundational rules of the constitution, but also, 
in cultural-sociological terms, the stimulation of cohesion and 
integration around a common identity [Přibáň 2007]. In the latter 
sense, the new constitutions could also be seen as vehicles of 
integration of the fragmented and conflictive post-communist 
societies. Also in the latter regard, the new constitutions can be 
regarded as recreating an existing, Westphalian model of national 
constitutional states that, in order to be legitimate and socially 
embedded, express a homogeneous, national language of identity, 
history, and tradition [cf. Přibáň 2007; Häberle 1992]. In the legal-
institutional as well as cultural-identitarian senses, the legal 
revolutions in the East constitute both a renewed entrance into 
the Western, capitalist and democratic world as well as the 
constitution of particularist, national political communities.  
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Fourth, it is common, even if not entirely accurate2, to 
understand the Central and Eastern European revolutions of 1989 
as having resulted in a strong break with the unconstitutional, 
communist past. As among others James Tully has argued, a main 
characteristic that differentiates ‘modern’ from ‘ancient’ 
constitutionalism is the former’s pretension to a complete break 
with the past [Tully 1995; cf. Ackerman 1992; Hart 2003]. In other 
words, modern constitutionalism understands the constitution as a 
foundational document that establishes a completely new order 
that is radically distinct from the preceding one. Even if a 
significantly novel tendency in the 1989 revolutions was that of 
‘legal continuity’ [cf. Arato 2000], implying a less than complete 
rupture with the existing legal orders, it can be argued that de facto 
the new constitutions have been interpreted as the foundations of 
an entirely new, or at least radically dissimilar, political, economic, 
and cultural order3. 
To sum up, the Central and Eastern European constitutions 
can be understood in at least four ways – as institutional 
constellations, as reflections of fundamental rights, as expressing 
national unity and identity, and as providing a clear rupture with 
the past – as a return to, and replications of modern, known 
forms of constitutionalism. In this reading, the re-emergence of 
modern constitutionalism in these countries has led to the (re-) 
                                                     
2 As far as I can see, the full history of the ‘rights revolutions’ in the region still needs 
to be written, in that, as accurately noted by Irena Grudzinska-Gross [1997], the 
convergence of both dissidents and communist reformers towards a legal language made 
such rights revolutions possible, and therefore, a binary view which counterposes post-
1989 democratization and constitutionalization to pre-1989 arbitrariness and ‘fake legality’ 
seems not to do justice to historical developments. On a different note, a singular emphasis 
on the rights and rule of law dimensions of the constitutions in the new democracies might 
further have the defect of leading away attention from the substantial diversity and plurality 
of constitutional perceptions that can be found in the constitutions of the region [see 
chapters 5-7 in Blokker 2009a]. 
3 Even in the case of Hungary, where an entirely new constitutional document was 
never adopted, and the democratic constitution of the post-1989 democratic state consists 
of an (admittedly radical) re-interpretation and extensive amendment of the Communist 
constitution, the post-1989 constitution has been understood as ultimately adding up to a 
far-going rupture with the past and as stipulating the foundational rules of the current 
democratic regime. It can, however, be argued that exactly in the case of Hungary, where 
one could argue modern constitutionalism, in particular in the guise of new 
constitutionalism, took hold most strongly, a powerful counternarrative of 
constitutionalism has emerged that in a number of ways invokes ancient rather than 
modern constitutionalism [Scheppele 2004; cf. Blokker 2009a]. 
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establishment of a classical, Westphalian type of nation-state with 
clear-cut constitutional orders and partaking in an international 
society of states4. 
3. Tensions in Modern Constitutionalism 
In the light of the four characteristics described above, it 
seems then reasonable to understand the Central and Eastern 
European constitutions as for a good part, if perhaps not 
exclusively, as having been set up within the Western, modern 
tradition of constitutionalism [cf. Piana 2006], and in some 
dimensions as even more orthodox or extensive. This grounding 
in a modern constitutional approach of Central and Eastern 
European constitutional orders might then logically be understood 
as subject to the tendencies of erosion and disenchantment that 
equally seem to affect Western European constitutional orders. In 
other words, the phenomenon of constitutional anomie, i.e., an 
incongruence between political and social realities and 
constitutional-legal structures, as can be observed in established 
democratic societies [cf. Walker 2002; Rosanvallon 2006], seems 
particularly relevant in the context of new constitutional 
democracies. 
Four problématiques can be outlined that affect the 
constitutional orders in the new democracies. These 
problématiques are equally compromising modern 
constitutionalism in more ‘advanced’ democracies [cf. Blokker 
forthcoming a], but the discussion here will focus on the more fragile 
regimes of the new democracies. The four problématiques 
discussed are: state-centrism, cultural diversity, depoliticization, 
and participation. 
 
                                                     
4 This argument is further corroborated by the suggestion that many of the 
constitutions in the region took a rather ‘souverainist’ turn by explicitly emphasising the 
protection of national sovereignty and independence in the new constitutional documents 
(partially as a reaction to previous subjection to the Soviet Union) [Albi 2005]. A further 
indication of the attachment to a modern form of constitutionalism –  and partially in 
contradiction to developments of Europeanization - is the recent following of the German 
pattern of national constitutionalism by a number of Constitutional Courts in the region 
[cf. Sadurski 2008]. 
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The Problématique of State-Centrism 
One of the most widely discussed problems of modern, 
Westphalian constitutionalism is its explicit grounding in the 
modern state [Walker 2002; 2008]. Apart from the historical 
injustices and forms of political violence that were at the basis of 
the formation of modern state, and that can be understood as 
having structurally compromised modern constitutionalism [cf. 
Tully 1995], it can be argued that the state-centred nature of 
modern constitutionalism is a key problem in current times of 
poly-centric globalization, in that it seems to correspond less and 
less to political and legal reality, in particular so within the 
complex context of European integration. In this regard, the 
“souverainist” constitutional projects of the new democracies 
[Albi 2005] can be seen as subject to eroding tendencies, such as 
the transfer of elements of sovereignty to the European level, as 
well as tendencies into the opposite direction, i.e., the transfer of 
prerogatives to the regional and local levels. Despite tendencies to 
the contrary5, the eroding trends seem part of a structural trend 
that will perhaps not so much undermine state sovereignty 
altogether, but certainly contributes to its modification, not least 
in terms of the fragmentation of sovereignty and the 
multiplication of its sites [cf. Rosanvallon 2006; Walker 2008]. 
Complicating factors in the case of the new democracies 
include the recent retrieval of autonomy in the region and a 
resulting strong emphasis on sovereignty and independence [Albi 
2007], and the related problem of a legacy of ‘socialist legality’ and 
relatively weakly embedded democratic-constitutional and 
democratic-political cultures [cf. Sajó 2005]. 
 
The Problématique of Cultural Diversity 
A second problem that affects all European societies but can 
be said to have deeper and more complex historical roots in 
Central and Eastern Europe is that of cultural pluralism and 
diversity. As Tully [1995] as well as others [MacDonald 1995] have 
argued, modern constitutionalism has an immanent tendency to 
                                                     
5 See, e.g., the recent decision of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht on the Lisbon 
Treaty (see the special issue of the German Law Journal 2009, 10(8); for the new 
democracies) [see Albi 2007; Sadurski 2008; Přibáň 2010]. 
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promote cultural homogenization and assimilation, and has a 
certain difficulty in dealing with cultural diversity and multi-
culturalism. In the words of James Tully, ‘modern 
constitutionalism comprises three concepts of popular sovereignty 
which eliminate cultural diversity as a constitutive aspects of 
politics. The people are sovereign and culturally homogeneous in 
the sense that culture is irrelevant, capable of being transcended, 
or uniform’ [1995, 63]. But it is by now equally a commonplace 
that modern constitutionalism cannot function without a ‘civic 
religion’ that is based on narratives of national belonging, cultural 
homogeneity, and a ‘conscience collective’ and is in need of a 
rather clear-cut hierarchy of authority and internal sovereignty [cf. 
MacDonald 1995, 3-4; Tully 1995].  
Two main (but problematic) approaches to cultural diversity 
stand out in the modern constitutional tradition. The first, the 
liberal tradition, has often been accused of ignoring cultural 
diversity in its endorsement of the idea of a neutral state. While 
cultural diversity is not necessarily explicitly repressed in the case 
of classical liberalism, its institutions and rules will tend to either 
implicitly favour the majority [cf. Kymlicka & Opalski 2001] or, at 
the very least, be inimical to questions of either cultural identity or 
cultural recognition. The second tradition, that of nationalism, 
explicitly favours a homogeneous, majority cultural identity as the 
basis of a stable constitutional order, but, in this, subjects or 
assimilates other, minority cultures to the majoritarian ideal. 
It is particularly the latter tradition that has often been seen as 
prominent in the new democracies [Přibáň 2007]. In most, if not 
all, constitutional debates in the region, protracted conflict has 
emerged between those that favour a neutral, liberal definition of 
national identity, and those that promote more particular, cultural 
understandings (the latter include representatives from both 
majority and minority groups). What makes the picture more 
complicated are evidently the claims of minority groups, often of a 
longstanding nature, which contest majoritarian and 
homogeneous definitions (either implicitly or explicitly so) of the 
newly established democratic states (the most clear-cut examples 
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are probably Romania6, Slovakia, and former Yugoslavia, but also 
Latvia and Lithuania)7. 
 
The Problématique of Depoliticization 
The novelty of ‘new constitutionalism’ in the post-communist 
region can be identified in a number of more or less shared, 
regionwide tendencies [Sadurski 2005]. First, there is the 
emergence of a level of judicialization of democratic politics, in 
particular in terms of Constitutional Courts acting as the guardians 
of the constitution as well as protectors of pre-political, 
fundamental rights. Secondly, an unusally strong emphasis on a 
legal language  - if not always practice - of fundamental rights and 
a singular, monist view of constitutionalism have emerged. As 
noted earlier, both the politically substitutive role of 
Constitutional Courts and the strong attachment to legal 
constitutionalism and fundamental rights can be understood in the 
specific context of democratic transition [cf. Arjomand 2003; 
Sadurski 2005]. A third element which is not usually deemed part 
of the notion of ‘new constitutionalism’ (which is anyhow applied 
also beyond the European context), but can be seen as amplifying 
some of its dimensions in the specific case of Central and Eastern 
Europe, is EU accession and membership. In terms of the joining 
of a wider pre-political rights consensus, the attempt to provide an 
external ‘anchor’ to the new democracies through EU 
membership, and a further entrenching of Constitutional Courts, 
                                                     
6 A case in point is the constitutional debate in Romania in the early 1990s, and again 
in 2003, in which a structural conflict between the Hungarian minority and the Romanian 
majority over the definition of the state as either national or multinational was prominent 
[cf. Blokker 2009a; Preda 2002]. As late as 2003, a representative of the Hungarian minority 
in Romania argued the following during the debate on constitutional revision: Thus, we 
believe that the national character of the state has been exceeded by history, it has become 
anachronistic. It is known that we criticized the syntagm of “national state” also in 1991, 
remaining consistent in this opinion, as it is a political category that has fulfilled its 
historical role, and has become dissonant with a modern Constitution, and we can specify 
that nothing similar appears in European fundamental laws, in the states of Europe 
[Dezbateri parlamentare, 18 June 2003; my translation]. 
7 The solution that has been offered by those that propose a kind of third way in the 
form of ‘liberal nationalism’ (see, in particular, the works of Will Kymlicka) is not 
convincing in all respects [Blokker 2008]. 
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EU membership can be seen as contributing to a specific – legal - 
understanding of constitutionalism8 [Piana 2006]. 
The prominence of the role of independent Constitutional 
Courts in the region has been widely debated [cf. Schwartz 2000]. 
From a critical point of view, it can be argued that the main 
features of ‘new constitutionalism’ overlap with what Richard 
Bellamy has labelled ‘legal constitutionalism’, and consist in the 
idea that constitutions ‘enshrine and secure the rights central to a 
democratic society’, and are understood as forms of ‘higher law’ 
which are difficult if not altogether impossible to change by 
political means. Moreover, the idea is that distinct judicial 
institutions and experts are best capable of defending and 
interpreting the constitution [Bellamy 2007, 1]. This form of 
‘democracy by judiciary’ finds two main forms of justification. 
First of all, the idea is that the post-communist societies are 
wanting in terms of both capable political and civil actors, and 
that independent, constitutional judges are the ones most capable 
of leading the new democracies into the direction of ‘normal 
democracies’. Second, it is sometimes argued that judicial review 
by independent constitutional experts might actually enhance the 
substance of democratic politics, thus considered a form of 
‘democratizing democracy’ [cf. Sadurski 2005, 12-13; Scheppele 
2005]. 
In a very much related way, a widespread, if not dominant, 
interpretation of constitutionalism in the region is informed by 
what I have called elsewhere the ‘ethic of rights’, i.e., the idea that 
identifies democracy with the liberal model of constitutional 
democracy based on (natural) rights, legal procedures, and the 
equality of citizens before the law [cf. Delanty 2000; Ferry & 
Renaut 1992; Přibáň 2005b, 308-09]. This monistic view of 
constitutional democracy often not only reduces democracy to 
liberal democracy, but also understands a specific set of 
                                                     
8 This is corroborated by Sajó [2005: 251-2], who argues that membership in the Union 
increases constitutional precommitment at the national constitutional level, since many 
constitutional elements that exist in the domestic constitution (human rights guarantees, for 
example, as seen by the impact of the anti-discrimination directive) are now beyond the 
reach of national majorities. Further, many constitutional elements are protected by 
European institutions that are independent of domestic politics. 
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(predefined) rights and their protection as its main aim9. A general 
trend in the constitutionalization of the region has been the 
interpretation of constitutions as vehicles of relatively unequivocal 
pre-political rights and values, and, in this, the absence of wider 
political and public debates on the foundations of the existing 
constitutions. As Sadurski has pointed out,  
 
in the process of anointing constitutional courts as the sole holders 
of constitutional virtue, an important insight has been lost: all the organs 
of the state – including the elected branches – are obliged to interpret 
and respect the Constitution, and there may be reasonable disagreements 
between people of good will (and, consequently, between various 
institutions empowered and obliged to conduct constitutional 
interpretation in the process of performing their constitutional duties) 
about what the Constitution really means [cf. Sadurski 2003b, 13].  
 
In other words, constitutions have been mostly understood as 
foundational documents that merely need interpretation by 
specialized institutions, notably Constitutional Courts, and much 
less so as vehicles of continuing dialogue over foundational values 
and rights, and the overall nature of the political community. 
The third element mentioned, EU membership, adds in some 
ways to the predominance of a legal constitutionalist tendency by 
embedding the new democracies in the wider EU community of 
law and constitutionalism, further entrenching a depoliticized, 
legal discourse. The political and legal conditionality that was part 
of the enlargement process meant that an external dimension 
played a strong role in the (re-)design of national democratic 
regimes. What is more, EU accession has also contributed to an 
enhanced standing of Constitutional Courts in their own national 
arenas as a kind of gatekeepers [Sadurski 2008, 3].  
These features of a distinctive, insulated constitutionalism in 
the region – the judicialization of politics, rights foundationalism, 
and European constitutionalism – are clearly not without 
problems and not beyond contestation. Indeed, depending on 
one’s view, new constitutionalism can be seen in all three 
                                                     
9 This is perhaps most clearly illustrated by Laszlo Solyom’s (the former Chief Justice 
of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, and former president of Hungary) invocation of the 
Constitutional Court’s role in protecting the ‘invisible constitution’. 
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dimensions as both enhancing, or, alternatively, as compromising 
constitutional democracy. But, be that as it may, it seems hard to 
deny that the three features or tendencies indicate the wider 
potential danger of an overall depoliticized and essentialistic view 
of democratic politics that denies any role of the larger demos and 
civil society, and its representatives, in playing a role in the 
definition of the foundational, ethical values that provide the 
constitutional context of the new democratic orders. This danger 
can be exemplified by the unusually expansionary or activist role 
of (some of the) Constitutional Courts in the region (in particular 
the Hungarian, Polish, and Czech ones), which has often been 
interpreted as a necessary but temporary substitute for weak civil 
societies and weak party systems in a process of transition to 
democracy. However, apart from the fact that a judicialized type 
of politics might become a self-perpetuating system rather than a 
temporary anomality [cf. Sadurski 2005], the substitution per se of 
democratic politics by a radically independent and unaccountable 
judicial institution can be seen to indicate an original sin that 
fatally compromises democracy as popular self-rule, and therefore 
fails in important ways to institutionalize a participatory 
democratic regime.  
 
The Problématique of Civic Exclusion 
The ‘original sin’ referred to above indicates a one-sided 
interpretation of constitutional democracy in which the 
constitution is seen (almost) exclusively as a limiting and ordering 
device, and only to a lesser extent as also an enabling and 
participatory device, promoting popular self-rule. The latter 
dimension appears to have played a much less important, even if 
not insignificant, role in post-communist constitution-making. 
The general tendency in the region has been constitutionalization 
by means of the drawing up of rights-based, liberal-inspired texts, 
and a strong entrenchment of the rule of law and fundamental 
rights, as well as to various extents the expression of a strong 
identity-based, communitarian dimension. Such a strong emphasis 
on the rule of law and rights entrenchment was not least the 
outcome of political action by the dissident movements in the 
region [Přibáň 2005a].  
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The civic dimension of the dissident legacy – that regarding 
participation and political activism of civil society – seems, 
however, less prominently institutionalized in the post-communist 
constitutional orders10. While the strong rights dimension 
admittedly includes a participatory dimension by means of the 
institutionalization of political and participatory rights [cf. Přibáň 
& Sadurksi 2006], and forms of civic association, freedom of 
speech, and communication have been ensured, it can be argued 
that the emphasis is on the implementation and protection of 
rights within the context of representative democracy, and much 
less so on a further strenghtening of civil society, expansion of 
civic input, the stimulation of substantive participation, and the 
promotion of forms of direct democracy (such as referenda) [cf. 
Rose-Ackerman 2005].  
The emphasis in the constitutionalization of democracy has 
been on the creation of stability, the limitation of arbitrary state 
power, and the promotion of legal certainty and coherence. This 
all amounts to a clear-cut invocation of a rights-based form of 
legitimization of constitutional democracy. Rights-based 
legitimation was admittedly not the only form of legitimation, as it 
was often complemented by an identity-based, symbolic type of 
legitimization, which favours social integration and cohesion. But 
a third type of democratic legitimation, which could be referred to 
as substantive participation (in itself grounded in an idea of self-
rule/autonomy or ‘input-oriented legitimation’) seems to have 
been increasingly marginalized in Central and Eastern European 
democratization [cf. Regulska 1993]. In this, the emphasis of 
constitutional actors was much less so on the facilitation of on-
going civic participation, forms of (local) self-government, and 
civic voice by means of referenda [for the cases of Hungary, 
Poland, and Romania, see Blokker 2009a]. Participatory 
dimensions, popular democracy, and civil society promotion, even 
if certainly not wholly absent from constitutions in the region, 
seem then to ultimately have an only secondary priority in 
constitutional hierarchies. This is further confirmed by the 
suggestion that such a one-sided attention for democratic stability 
                                                     
10 See, however, for some indications of its continuing significance in a constitutional 
sense [Blokker forthcoming b]. 
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and the rule of law was additionally reinforced by EU 
conditionality [Malova & Dolny 2008]. 
As noted, this development is in a way surprising in that in at 
least in some societies, as is well-known (in particular in Hungary, 
the Czech Republic, and Poland), strong calls for self-rule and 
civic engagement were expressed in the years prior to the collapse 
of communism, and have played an important role in its demise. 
Dissident ideas indeed included the endorsement of forms of 
substantive, self-conscious civic participation, more direct forms 
of democracy, as well as political dissent [cf. Klingsberg 1992; 
Blokker 2009a, forthcoming b; Přibáň 2002], as it was, for instance, 
expressed in the constitutional draft of the Civic Forum in 
Czechoslovakia, or in Solidarity’s programme of self-government 
('The Self-Governing Republic'). Such an emphasis on civic 
participation is not easily reconciled with a one-sided legalist 
interpretation of constitutionalism. Nevertheless, in particular in 
the new democracies' context of widespread civic apathy and 
distrust in politics, participatory democratic channels would seem 
to be in need of positive endorsement [cf. Rose-Ackermann 
2005]. This could be importantly done, even if not only so, 
through constitutional arrangements [Klingsberg 1992, 881]. The 
problématique of participation in the new democracies – clearly 
subject to forms of civic disenchantment and distrust in formal 
politics - consists then in the fact that in the new constitutional 
democracies a fairly strong tension exists between a dominant 
language of legalism, fundamental rights, and the rule of law, on 
the one hand, and the need to find ways of civic inclusion, civic 
participation and self-rule, and local government, on the other.  
4. Exploring Democratic Potentialities 
Modern constitutionalism tends to ‘presuppose the uniformity 
of a nation state with a centralised and unitary system of legal and 
political institutions’ [Tully 1995, 9]. Constitutionalism in the new 
democracies can for a good part said to be grounded in such a 
modern, and, as indicated above, in a number of significant ways 
increasingly obsolete or anachronistic conception, of 
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constitutionalism11. The predominant interpretation of modern 
constitutionalism in the region involves a liberal, legal 
understanding of constitutionalism, and an unusual emphasis on 
the principle of sovereignty, the higher-law status of the 
constitutions, and their safeguarding by powerful constitutional 
courts [Albi 2007, 32-33]. 
 
Four Tensions 
I will here briefly recap the problématiques outlined above that 
illustrate the potentially anachronistic dimensions of Central and 
Eastern European constitutionalism, before turning to possible, 
democratic remedies. The four problématiques of a modern 
understanding – state-centrism, cultural identity, depoliticization, 
and civic exclusion - render the new constitutional democracies 
less democratic, and less open to cultural diversity, ideational 
pluralism, and civic participation. But what is more, the four 
problématiques can be said to induce a form of constitutional 
anomie, in that existing constitutional orders are in important 
ways increasingly out of touch with a European-wide reality of 
post-nationalism, cultural diversity, civic disenchantment, and calls 
for civic voice. 
First, it is by now widely acknowledged that the modern state 
is not anymore capable of acting as a contained and coherent 
steering mechanism in an increasingly globalized world, and that it 
cannot be seen as a closed framework for citizenship and 
democratic politics anymore [Walker 2002, 319]. In other words, 
modern constitutionalism is state-centred at a moment in which it 
has become increasingly clear that the sovereignty of state units 
cannot be taken for granted anymore, and needs to be seen in the 
context of a much more complex picture of multiple and 
overlapping sovereignties, particularly so in the European context. 
This discrepancy leads to problems of accountability, democratic 
legitimacy, equality, and civic input. This discrepancy is even more 
distressing in societies that have fairly recently embarked on 
revolutions that had as their explicit aim the institutionalization of 
democratic, autonomous regimes [cf. Howard 2009]. 
                                                     
11 For a concise discussion of constitutionalism in the light of three significant trends 
of pluralism, see [Blokker forthcoming a]. 
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Second, modern constitutionalism expresses culturally 
homogeneous identities when societies are showing to be 
increasingly culturally pluralistic, and cultural groups to be 
increasingly engaged in cross-border interaction. In this, modern 
constitutionalism has difficulties in accommodating cultural 
diversity and claims of cultural recognition. Problems around 
issues of cultural diversity have (re-)emerged with force in the 
post-communist societies, in which issues of cultural identity had 
for a long time been repressed or manipulated by the party-state. 
Current tensions on the basis of claims for cultural recognition 
and pluralism are an important factor of protracted conflict in the 
new democracies (such as in the cases of Romania and Slovakia). 
Among intractable problems are the unitary perception of the 
state, a homogeneous, majoritarian idenity, and the lack of 
constitutional co-authorship of national minorities. These can be 
seen as immanent features of modern constitutionalism [cf. 
Lindahl 2008]. Demands for cultural pluralism and regional self-
government are in this unitary mindset too easily dismissed as 
threats to democracy and as favouring fragmentation and 
disintegration [cf. Tully 1995, 9; 2008]. 
Third, modern constitutionalism is depoliticizing politics in a 
moment of widespread civic disengagement and disillusionment in 
politics. The trend towards depoliticization and the externalization 
of constitutionalism (i.e., a foundationalist, prepolitical view of the 
premises of constitutional regimes) adds up to the hollowing out 
of democratic politics by removing foundational values and 
constitutive matters from political debate, and by equalizing 
democracy with the legal guardianship of pre-political values by a 
supposedly neutral, judicial authority. The view that new 
constitutionalism is to provide the firm bedrock of democratic 
transformation, and that Constitutional Courts are guarding and 
expanding democratic rights, tolerance, and cultural and religious 
diversity is, however, ambiguous. As argued by Wojciech Sadurski, 
robust judicial review might even have a ‘negative educational 
effect’: ‘it may help to generate the perception that the rights 
discourse is an obscure activity reserved for lawyers, and that 
deliberation about the political values that give rise to specific 
articulations of rights is something over which neither the 
population nor its elected representatives have any control’ [2005, 
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20]. The anxiety to fix the rule of law, the Rechtsstaat, and 
fundamental rights once and for all after the experience of 
arbitrary and non-functioning ‘socialist legality’ might then 
backfire in that politics is emptied up to the extent that the 
fundamental rules – and identity - of the polity are not open for 
debate, and democratic participation is reduced to the retrieval of 
rights, but does not include any meaningful deliberation over their 
meaning. 
Fourth, modern constitutionalism emphasizes stability, 
representation, and elitism in a moment in which deliberation, 
participation from below, and intra-societal dialogue are 
increasingly seen as indispensable for democratic legitimacy [cf. 
Dryzek 2004]. In this, modern, state-centred constitutionalism is 
too much biased towards public institutions and instituted 
political society, and much less so takes into account non-state, 
civic and private forms of participation in sovereignty and 
constitutional debate. Modern constitutionalism might be seen as 
simply too much ‘dominated by the image of public institutions 
holding the centre of political and economic life’ [Walker 2002, 
323-4, 323; Rosanvallon 2006]. 
 
Possible Remedies? 
While it is difficult to completely sidestep the epistemic image 
of a rights-based, liberal constitutional framework, which indeed 
seems indispensable to a modern democratic regime (for instance, 
in its providing for participatory rights), this does not mean that 
its hold necessarily exhausts the notion of constitutional 
democracy as such [cf. Blokker 2010]. In other words, a normative 
extension of a such a minimal constitutionalist regime points to 
the possibilities of ‘civic’ or ‘grassroots’ constitutionalism [cf. 
Skapska 1999], which involve intra-societal deliberation on 
constitutional norms, as well as a variety of channels for civic 
participation in such constitutional deliberation12. One definition 
of such a participatory, civic and post-modern type of 
constitutionalism is provided by Grazyna Skapska: ‘a process of 
slow formation of constitutional principles “from below”, in the 
                                                     
12 Beyond parliamentary engagement one could point to, for instance, constitutional 
referenda, Ombudsmen, and citizens’ initiatives. 
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every-day experience of citizens participating in local 
governments, non-governmental organizations, associations, and 
ethics commissions whose members participate in the decision-
making processes or in conflict resolution, and construct their by-
laws’ [1999, 168]. 
In the light of these intrinsic problems of modern 
constitutionalism, it seems imperative to, first of all, study more 
comprehensively and closely than has been done so far13 to what 
extent the new constitutional orders and cultures in the post-
communist societies are able to engage in, and offer instruments 
for, developing more flexible and reflexive ways of dealing with 
contemporary and future challenges in terms of pluralism, 
multiple levels of sovereignty, supranational integration, 
constitutional change, civic participation, and local self-
government. In this regard, a comparative engagement with the 
constitutional role of notions of subsidiarity, (national) identity, 
supremacy of international and European law, constitutional 
amendment, civil spheres, as well as local forms of governance in 
the region could provide a picture as to what extent these 
constitutional orders are indeed anachronistic and unfit for the 
post-nationalist age, or might have some means to confront a 
novel situation14.  
With regard to the state-centredness of Central and Eastern 
European constitutions, its traditionalist focus on the state as the 
pinnacle of constitutionalism is evident enough [cf. Albi 2005], 
but this in itself does not deny the existence of any parallel 
constitutional values and narratives that indicate alternative ways 
of understanding constitutionalism [cf. Blokker forthcoming b]. In a 
fairly simplistic, but for preliminary research sufficient distinction, 
one could look at to what extent the constitutions of the new 
democracies make it possible to deal flexibly and adequately with 
the international (notably EU) and global levels, on the one hand, 
and the subnational, regional and local levels, on the other. 
                                                     
13 See, however, for excellent studies in this direction (without, however, systematically 
looking for specific instruments or forms of constitutionalism fit for the post-national age): 
Albi [2005]; Sadurski [2003]; Přibáň and Young [1999]. 
14 The examples from various post-communist countries I will provide below are 
unsystematic and fairly scattered, but I believe, nevertheless significant, evidence of the 
availability of potential means to confront the post-national age.   
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Regarding the level beyond the nation-state, it has often been 
argued that a process of polycentric globalization affects nation-
states and their constitutions in a variety of (often deemed 
negative) ways [cf. Teubner 2003]. It can then be argued that the 
constitutions of the new democracies would, first of all, need to 
recognize the existence of competing forms of constitutionalism 
(in terms of civic, private, as well as international and global 
forms), and, where possible, to accommodate these, but also, and 
more importantly, to provide effective means to act against 
significant erosion of popular sovereignty. 
The most clear-cut case of a post-national impact on the new 
democracies is obviously European integration, and advancing 
European constitutionalization. In the EU context, one future-
oriented (but not uncontested) approach would be the active 
participation in the development of a European constitution, the 
explicit acknowledgement and accommodation of EU law in 
national law, and the attempt to devise a form of post-national 
constitutionalism that would be able to withstand global 
‘constitutional competition’ [cf. Habermas 2001]. The most 
effective approach – suitable for the age of legal pluralism – has 
been identied as 'co-operative constitutionalism' or 'judicial 
dialogues' [Albi 2007, 27]. A contrasting, and largely preservative 
and probably ineffective and conflictive approach (although this is 
evidently debatable), would be the attempt to protect national 
constitutionalism from external encroachment, and try to keep 
national prerogatives in place [cf. Albi 2005; Sadurski 2008]. 
So far, the attitude towards 'co-operative constitutionalism' in 
the region has been evaluated as complex and ambivalent. On the 
one hand, a number of observers has argued that both the 
constitutional texts and the approach taken by Constitutional 
Courts in the region show an unusually strong attachment to the 
supremacy of national constitutions, and to the principles of 
sovereignty and independence, and a reluctance to grant 
Community law supremacy [Albi 2007; Sadurski 2008]. On the 
other hand, as shown by Anneli Albi [Albi 2007], it can be argued 
that Constitutional Courts have attempted to engage in inter-
institutional dialogue and mutual co-operation in order to avoid 
conflicts between the European and national levels, and in this, 
endorse a common search for commonly held principles and the 
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limits of a plurality of jurisdictions. The latter indicates the 
availability of a favourable attitude (at least of constitutional 
actors) towards strengthening a post-national, EU-wide 
constitutional project that attempts to deal with contemporary 
complexity. 
On the substate level, there is a potential tension between a 
state-centric and centralist view as immanent in modern 
constitutionalism and visions of local self-governance, subsidiarity, 
and pluralistic views of self-determination. This tension is 
particularly prominent in post-communist societies, where the 
revolutions of 1989 were in many countries understood as an 
appropriate occasion to counter the hierarchical structures of 
'democratic centralism' [Regulska 1993, 133-34]. The drive 
towards local self-governance in the immediate post-1989 period 
was evidently inspired by dissident ideas with a republican 
character, but equally coincides with increasingly popular West-
European ideas of local democracy, decentralization, and 
regionalism. It can then be argued that centralistic trends in 
modern constitutionalism can be importantly countered by novel 
forms of civic engagement and local self-government, which 
might provide antidotes to centralism, but also to the fragmented 
nature of post-Westphalian sovereignty and increasing civic 
alienation.  
It needs to be recognized that in the twenty years that have 
passed since 1989,  the predicament of civic and participatory 
democracy in Central and Eastern Europe has  increasingly been 
evaluated in negative terms. But, in this, alternative, and to some 
extent promising, tendencies - sometimes related to (dissident) 
participatory legacies of the past, sometimes to the corrolaries of 
European integration - have been often overlooked [cf. Blokker 
forthcoming b]. Available alternative narratives of constitutional 
demcocracy in the region hold that disenchantment with 
democratic politics should be countered by means of the 
stimulation of political subjectivity in civil society [Klingsberg 
1992]. This implies that the state needs to set limits on its own 
interference, and that traditional parliamentary and party politics 
needs to be supplemented by civic initiatives [cf. Skapska 1999, 
169]. 
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While quite a number of attempts to promote such a vision in 
the early 1990s has foundered, the same attempts have also often 
left constitutional 'traces' as well as embedded a democratic 
narrative that might potentially be, and on some occasions have 
been, re-activated15. In the Czech Constitution of 1992, for 
instance, constitutional traces of dissident ideas of civic 
participation are evident. As Magdalena Hadjiisky argues, one of 
such traces in the Czech Constitution regards the emphasis on 
territorial decentralisation, local civic autonomy, and the 
qualification of local self-government a 'fundamental 
constitutional rule' [Hadjiisky 2001, 48; cf. Pontuso 2002].  
A similar, civic-democratic narrative of local autonomy can be 
found in Hungary, where it equally has had important formal-legal 
implications. Thus, in 1990, legislation was adopted that 
established a 'very high degree of autonomy for the lowest, local 
level of government', while the constitution enshrined the right to 
self-government at local and county levels as a constitutional 
principle [Fowler 2001, 8; cf. Jenei & Szalai 2002; Blokker 2009a, 
108]. In this, Hungarian decentralization is often mentioned 
together with the case of Poland, where the decentralisation of 
local government has arguably been a success [Regulski 2003] and 
one of the most effective in the region [cf. Wollmann and Lankina 
2003, 116-117].  Also in the Polish case, the attention for local 
self-government and civic participation is clearly related to the 
dissident (Solidarity) legacy, even if the latter's original idea of a 
'self-governing republic' has never been realized in any extensive 
way. On the one hand, then, it can be argued that 'local self-
government in Poland found a permanent place within the post-
transformation political landscape' (also by means of its 
constitutionalization in Chapter VII of the 1997 Constitution), but 
at the same time, tendencies at recentralization and civic 
disinterest can be detected [Regulska 2009]. What is significant, 
though, is that tensions over local self-government, and 
appropriate relations between the centre and periphery continue 
to exist, indicating the unsettled nature of local democracy. 
                                                     
15 That liberal, legal constitutionalism in the region is by no means a settled 
understanding becomes clear from the fact that constitutional democracy remains a 
controversial issue in many of the new democracies, and frequent disputes over 
constitutional revision are widespread [cf. Pontuso 2002; Blokker 2009a]. 
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With regard to the second problématique, the immanent drive 
towards cultural uniformity in modern constitutionalism, there is a 
clear tension between the cultural homogeneity of a majority 
nation with the plurality and cultural diversity that many, if not all, 
of the Central and Eastern European societies display [cf. Geroe 
& Gump 1994]. Obstinance by national majorities to provide 
explicit (including constitutional) acknowledgement of the multi-
cultural nature of their states clearly continue to fuel intercultural 
tensions and constitutional conflict.  
The uniformity and cultural homogeneity – either implicit (e.g., 
in terms of language stipulations) or explicit (in terms of 
definitions of national identity and citizenship) - that designates 
typical modern constitutions can, however, be moderated by 
forms of a mutual recognition of identities (rather than a one-
sided imposition), and by the accommodation of cultural plurality, 
and its transformation, by means of a continuous constitutional 
dialogue and mutual formulation of shared constitution values [cf. 
Kymlicka and Opalski 2001]. The emphasis in this would be less 
on the formal ‘co-existence’ of various cultural groups in 
constitutional democracies, united by an existing constitution, but 
rather on the facilitation of ‘co-authorship’ of the rules of the 
political community [Blokker 2008, 370; Ringelheim 2010]. 
Such facilitation comprises at least two forms of pluralistic 
accommodation. First, the definition of a common identity would 
need to be pluralistic and dynamic. The pluricultural nature of 
modern polities would need (explicit) constitutional recognition, 
while the underpinning idea of culture and cultural identity would 
need to recognize the ‘overlapping, interacting, and contested’ 
nature of human cultures [Tully 1995, 186]. In other words, a 
cultural identity should not be fixed once and for all on the 
constitutional level, and intercultural dialogue needs to be 
facilitated. 
That definitions which go some way towards a pluralistic, 
multi-national view are not wholly absent from the region (in 
contrast to sweeping statements on the region's historical 
inclination towards ethnocultural forms of nationalism) is shown 
by the example of constitutional accommodation of cultural 
pluralism and 'co-authorship' in the Hungarian Constitution. The 
latter states in article 68 (1) that '[t]he national and linguistic 
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minorities in the Republic of Hungary shall share in the people’s 
power, being constituent elements of the state' (emphasis added). This 
constitutional definition clearly goes against unitary and 
homogeneous understandings of an ethno-cultural majority 
nation, and should be understood in concommittance with the 
constitutional stipulation of a fairly wide range of negative and 
positive minority rights. In a sense broader than constitutional co-
authorship, then, Hungary has sometimes been depicted as a 
frontrunner in the endorsement of internal cultural pluralism, in 
particular in the form of (collective) minority rights, and as having 
a ‘strong constitutional framework within which to provide for the 
collective protection of minority rights’ [Geroe & Gump 1994, 
673; cf. Přibáň and Sadurski 2006]16. 
Second, culture-sensitive constitutions would need to 
recognize the plural cultural nature of existing polities by means of 
specific (in some cases, group) rights, forms of decentralization 
and local autonomy, and instruments for intercultural interaction 
and communication. Apart from the Hungarian case, a further 
interesting one is that of Romania, where from the adoption of 
the 1991 Constitution onwards there has been continuous 
(including constitutional) conflict over unitarian definitions of the 
Romanian state. The Romanian 1991 Constitution has been 
defined as reflecting a form of 'constitutional nationalism' as, 
among others, it contains in article 1 an unambiguous (and 
difficult to amend) unitarian definition of the Romanian state 
[Blokker 2009a]. By 2003, however, in anticipation of EU 
membership, a few fairly fargoing concessions to minority rights 
and participation have been included in the amended  
Constitution. The articles 120 (2) and 128 (2) contain a significant 
extension of the usage of the mother tongue of minorities in 
                                                     
16 The existence of an open, pluralistic constitutional definition does, unfortunately, 
not mean that in legal reality homogenizing views of nation are wholly absent, as is, for 
instance, visible in Hungarian citizenship law [cf. Přibáň 2007; Blokker 2009a]. Indeed, the 
Hungarian constitutional arrangement has  been criticized for not effectively implementing 
minority rights, and for equally containing (latent) forms of ethno-nationalism. The latter 
aspects can, nevertheless, be put in a milder light if one accepts the view that nationalist 
tendencies are moderated by the fact that Hungarian nationalists and populists seem by 
now to have accepted a ‘rights’ language, to the detriment of revisionism, and are 
counterposed by non-nationalist political groups which play an important role in 
Hungarian politics [Kis 2001]. In other words, there might be room for further ‘learning 
processes’, partially induced by current constitutional arrangements. 
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interaction with public institutions (the public administration and 
judiciary institutions). In addition, article 33 on the right to access 
to culture has been introduced. This right refers to access to 
national culture, and the promotion of Romanian culture in the 
world (33 (3)), and could in that sense be seen as emphasizing an 
‘ethic of identity’ [see Blokker 2009a], but this right is also 
extended to national minorities, stipulating an individual right to 
access to culture, and therefore expanding the available set of 
rights [Constantinescu et al. 2004, 70–71]. 
The third problématique, that of the depoliticized nature of 
democracy in the Central and Eastern European region, resulting 
from the judicialization of (constitutional) politics, the pre-
political status of rights, and a certain subjection to EU 
supremacy, can be (partially) reversed or adjusted by a re-
politicization of (constitutional) politics. The judicialization of 
constitutional politics has been contested as being indefensible in 
terms of both its legitimacy and its effectiveness [Bellamy 2007]. 
In order to correct an exaggerated hold of the judiciary over 
constitutional politics, terrain would need to be regained in terms 
of parliamentary politics, as well as of civic participation, beyond 
the monism of judicial predominance. In other words, a 
comparative review of the region’s constitutions would need to 
take into account to what extent elected institutions deliberate on 
and are involved in constitutional matters, and in cases of very 
strong Constitutional Courts, to what extent and under what 
conditions a political engagement might be expanded. But this 
would probably not be sufficient to repoliticize constitutional 
politics effectively. It needs further to be assessed to what extent 
constitutions are actually facilitating public deliberation over, and 
interference into constitutional matters [by means of, e.g., public 
debate, ‘constituent assemblies from below’, referenda, and citizen 
initiatives, see Colon-Rios 2009; Hart 2003; Tierney 2009]. A truly 
democratic approach to constitutionalism would transcend the 
foundational, fixed nature of modern constitutionalism, and instill 
a deliberative and participatory element [cf. Hart 2003]. 
It can hardly be denied that there is a clear rationale for the 
insistence on a form of ‘negative constitutionalism’ in the post-
communist societies– with a bill of rights and judicial review at its 
core – i.e., the ‘primarily negative purpose of preventing tyranny’ 
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[Holmes 1993, 23]. But any form of rights foundationalism – 
which in Central and Eastern Europe is manifested in a 
(variegating) tendency to entrench rights in constitutions that 
subsequently can be interpreted only by Constitutional Courts – is 
difficult to uphold in the light of the ‘essentially contestable’ 
nature of rights [cf. Ferry and Renaut 1992; Kis 2003; Rosenfeld 
2006; Sadurski 2003b], and, more importantly, might produce 
counterproductive or 'counterconstitutional' effects [cf. Sadurski 
2005; Albert 2008]. The myth of a pre-political content of rights 
that can be fixed once and for all in constitutional documents, and 
of which Constitutional Courts are the best interpreters, 
contributes to a further alienation of citizens from democratic 
politics, and prevents the diffusion of constitutional and rights 
reasoning throughout a wider political culture. Rights, as well as 
other constitutional values, should rather be part of public debate 
as well as civic participation in (constitutional) politics. This could 
also include intermittent redefinition (even if this process could 
itself be subject to rather strict limitations and specific 
procedures). 
In more concrete terms, the furtherance of constitutional-
democratic legitimacy  would need wider civic participation in 
constitutional politics; in other words, a form of ‘democratic 
constitutionalism’ [see Arato 2000; Tully 2008]. The need for this 
in itself depends in part on the level of constitutional insulation in 
any given constitutional order, and in particular on the specific 
amendment rules of the constitution. In this regard, as a useful 
normative yardstick, one might follow three desiderata for civic 
constitutional participation, as suggested by Andrew Arato [Arato 
2000, 196–197; cf. Blokker 2009b]. Arato’s original proposal 
regarded the specific Hungarian context in the early 1990s, but 
can, I believe, be taken to have a more general significance. 
Civic participation in constitutional politics would need, first 
of all, the ‘continuation of the original East European method of 
constitution making,’ i.e., a political commitment to radical change 
without, however, violating the principle of legality. The acts of 
constitution-making in the region (in particular in Hungary and 
Poland) - through Round Tables, legal continuity, and 
Constitutional Courts – can be seen as providing promising 
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foundations in terms of pluralistic participation [cf. Arato 2009]17. 
The essence of Arato’s suggestion to seriously consider the ‘East 
European method’ is to reflect on ‘what is needed to bring the 
process [of constitution-making, pb] to an always provisionally 
close and how future access can be opened up in such as way that 
civil society preserves a potential influence over constitutional 
change’ [Arato 2000, 195-6]. 
Second, Arato suggests the broadening of the sphere of 
politics by means of the guarantee of a plurality of constitutionally 
relevant political agents, which means that the fundamental rules 
of the polity need to be open to “the creative input of a wider 
range of social forces.” Nevertheless, as observed earlier, in the 
current situation in most of the new member states, variegated 
and direct civic participation in the amendment of the 
foundational rules – complementary to formal political actors -  is 
most of the time restricted. In, for instance, the Hungarian case, 
constitutional change can only be initiated by two-thirds of the 
parliament, while in Romania the civic pathway is formally 
available, but in reality extremely difficult to complete. In Poland, 
civic voice in constitutional matters is possible, but only on 
initiative of the Sejm, the senate or the president [Blokker 2009a, 
chapter 7].  
And third, in order to improve the legitimacy of democratic 
politics, it is important to provide the “opportunity also for the 
less-formalized participation [in constitutional politics, pb] of the 
public by individuals and concerned organizations” in order to 
create a “Tocquevillian moment of constitution making”, in 
particular by means of public discussion and forms of 
deliberation. That attempts to induce civic participation are not 
wholly absent in the region is shown by the example of Romania, 
where in an attempt to stimulate wider, societal deliberation on 
constitutional amendment by citizens and components of civil 
society, a so-called Constitutional Forum was organized in the 
run-up to the amendment of the Constitution in the context of 
EU membership in 2003. 
                                                     
17 It should be admitted, though, that a more inclusive and pluralistic type of 
constitutional politics has not persevered afterwards, in that none of the constitutions in 
the region offer wide-ranging possibilities for civic engagement in constitutional change, 
and if they do, it is often under rigid conditions (as, for instance, in the Romanian case). 
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A common normative thread regarding solutions to all the 
problématiques mentioned above – state-centrism, cultural 
diversity, and depoliticization – points to the importance of civic 
engagement, not least regarding constitutional norms and rights. 
This brings us to the final problématique, that is, the extent that 
existing constitutions actually facilitate forms of civic participation in 
politics in general [cf. Albert 2008]. It can be argued that a 
democratic form of constitutionalism cannot be confined to a 
legal, reductionist view of constitutions that perceive the role of 
the latter in a purely negative light. Rather, if constitutionalism is 
to be democratic, it needs to provide ways for citizens to be 
involved in the formulation and revision of the rules and norms 
that govern a polity. 
As observed earlier, despite a diffused adherence to a legal-
foundationalist view of constitutionalism, some significant 
ideational legacies of civic participation and direct forms of 
democracy clearly also exist in the Central and Eastern European 
region, and have contributed directly to the demise of 
communism [cf. Dryzek and Holmes 2002; Přibáň 2002]. It would 
indeed be surprising if none of these ideas had been upheld in the 
wake of 1989, and if a legalist reading of democracy would have 
exhausted the profound changes in the region. As observed 
above, it seems ultimately more accurate to argue that, while the 
legalist dimensions in Central and Eastern European processes of 
constitutionalization were predominant, other, more civically 
conducive dimensions are not insignificant either [cf. Sadurski and 
Přibáň 2006, 215-19; Blokker forthcoming b]. The dimension of 
civic participation and forms of direct democracy in the context of 
constitution-making seem to have been in many ways ignored by 
observers, but have not altogether disappeared from the 
constitutional scene, and in have some cases even been revived18. 
In this regard, the thesis that civil society as a discourse and 
practice has been widely compromised since 1989 is not accurate 
and overpessimistic, also since a number of positive engagements 
                                                     
18 In Hungary, for instance, the much overdue regulation of referenda in 1997 led to 
the constitutionalization of fundamental rules regarding referenda. At least in a formal 
sense, this can be interpreted as an increase in the status of direct democracy in the 
Hungarian constitutional order [Dezsö & Bragyova 2007: 70]. 
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with the (constitutional) facilitation of civic participation can be 
pointed out [see above; cf. Arato 2000, chapters 2 and 4]. 
Ideas of civic participation, self-rule, and local self-government 
have had some significant impact on the post-1989 constitutional 
orders. In the early 1990s, Ethan Klingsberg already elaborated on 
the role constitutional rules can play in endorsing civic 
participation while observing some positive trends in Hungary 
[Klingsberg 1992], while probably the most optimistic expert on 
civil society in the region, Andrew Arato, noted that ‘reports 
concerning the demise of civil society turned out to be premature’ 
and that ‘constitutional arrangements facilitated in various ways 
and degrees the reemergence of civic associations and initiatives 
and their reinsertion into national politics’ [2000, 70-71]. A 
significant instance is in this sense the Polish case, as pointed out 
by Ewa Popławska [1997; see for the wider Central and Eastern 
European context, Bruce 2006]. Popławska emphasizes the 
importance of the idea of subsidiarity in Polish constitutionalism, 
an idea which can be seen as closely related to ideas of civic 
autonomy and self-government. Subsidiarity is one of the 
fundamental principles of the Polish constitution of 1997, and, 
even if it is only explicitly mentioned in the preamble, it provides a 
normative indication and is reflected in the actual text in various 
ways. In this, Popławska has argued that subsidiarity in the 
context of constitutional law can be related to three principles: 
pluralism, decentralization, and democracy or self-government. 
Reflections of subsidiarity can be found in both the Small 
Constitution of 1992 and in the 1997 Constitution (in significant 
articles related to the common good, civil society, citizens' 
initiatives, and local self-government), and its intriguing, even if 
ambiguous, pedigree can be related to not only European 
integration19 and Catholic thought, but also dissident ideas of the 
1980s.   
The problématique of civic participation and self-government 
points at a predominance of legal constitutionalism, state-centred 
politics, and a representative understanding of democracy that 
                                                     
19 In the context of European integration, discussions of 'co-operative 
constitutionalism' regarding the relation between supranational and national levels are 
clearly related to the notion of subsidiarity. 
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clashes with more participatory, civic forms of constitutionalism 
and of politics in general, or that at the very least might exacerbate 
widespread civic disenchantment with politics. One way of 
contributing to some resolution of the paradoxes pointed out at 
the beginning of the paper would be research that steers away 
from one-sided attention for legal modern constitutionalism, 
rights entrenchment and application, and the rule of law, and that 
engages in further investigations into the endurance of dissident 
legacies, including the less visible, but not necessarily negligible 
participatory dimensions of the current constitutional regimes. 
These dimensions would need to include such issues as the 
stimulation of civic association through constitutional guarantee, 
civic access to national legislative and local referenda, and 
extensive and effective forms of decentralization and self-
government20. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
I have argued that the new democracies in Central and Eastern 
Europe have adopted known and tested models of constitutional 
democracy (even if with distinctive features), leading their 
societies away from the vagaries of 'socialist legality' towards 
stable, democratic orders. However, the trajectory of modern 
constitutionalism brings with it – in a post-Westphalian era - a 
number of problématiques that threaten some of the core features 
of that very same constitutional model. This means that in some 
ways one can speak of a situation of constitutional anomie, as 
tensions have emerged in the region with regard to the state-
centric focus and perception of national sovereignty of modern 
constitutionalism, as well as with regard to homogeneous 
formulations of collective identity. What is more, there are strong 
tendencies in the new member states towards a legalistic rather 
than a democratic interpretation of constitutionalism, visible in 
terms of the judicialization of democracy as well as in a 
predominance of legal-formalistic over democratic-participatory 
understandings of constitutionalism. But, at the same time, there 
                                                     
20 See, for one of the very few contributions in this area, Auer and Buetzer [2001]. 
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are signs of democratic potentiality and pluralism in the existing 
constitutional orders, that, if strengthened and explicated, might 
increase the legitimacy and societal embeddedness of the new 
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The recent (re-)establishment of constitutional democracies in Central and Eastern Europe 
is affected by a paradoxical situation: while modern constitutionalism was significantly 
strenghtened by the ‘new constitutionalism’ in the region, it is itself increasingly seen as out of 
touch with (pluralist) reality. In the paper, I explore to what extent it can be claimed that the 
new constitutionalism adopted in the former communist countries is a reinvigorated version of 
‘traditional’ modern constitutionalism. To the extent that this seems indeed to be the case,
I outline a number of problématiques or tensions that modern constitutionalism provokes in the 
current European context. These include four problématiques in particular: state-centrism,
cultural diversity, depoliticization, and participation. In the third section, I will discuss possible 
solutions to or ways out of these four problématiques by hinting at, in a descriptive sense, 
insufficiently (or un-)explored dimensions of the Central and Eastern European constitutions.
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constitutional change that would, in my view, make current constitutional orders more amenable 
to challenges of pluralism, democratic legitimacy, and post-nationalism. 
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